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ABSTRACT 
 
 
POLITICAL TACTICS IN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY FROM THE ARCHITECTS’ PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Political behavior in organizations has been the subject of numerous studies.  
The emergent picture from these studies is that political behavior in organizations is an 
inevitable part of any human-based activity. Architectural design practice is one of 
those human-based activities. Political behaviors are inevitable reality of any human 
based activity.  Political behavior can have functional or dysfunctional consequences.  
The key challenge facing architects is managing political behavior in order to reduce or 
eliminate dysfunctional consequences of political behavior. Managing political behavior 
starts with understanding and identifying political tactics used by social actors involved 
in architectural design practice.  The research presented in this thesis builds on this 
premise.  It empirically explores (1) the use of political tactics by primary social actors 
of any construction project (i.e., clients, main-contractors and subcontractors) (2) 
communication channel used in send politically motivated messages by social actors 
and (3) frequency of political tactics used throughout different stages of a construction 
project.  The research findings reveal that political tactics are commonly used in 
architectural design practice and political tactics are most frequently used by social 
actors in the construction process.  Furthermore, research findings suggest that social 
actors use oral communication channels rather than written communication channels for 
sending politically motivated messages, and the main-contractors heavily use political 
behavior in the architectural design practice. 
 
 Key words: organizational politics, political tactics, political behavior, 
architectural design and construction practice in Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
BİNA YAPIM SEKTÖRÜNDE MİMARLARIN BAKIŞ 
AÇISINDAN POLİTİK TAKTİKLER 
 
 
Organizasyonlardaki politik davranış çeşitli birçok çalışmaya konu olmuştur. Bu 
çalışmalarda ortaya çıkan tablo organizasyonlardaki politik davranışın, her türlü insan 
odaklı etkinliğin kaçınılmaz bir parçası olduğudur. İnsan odaklı faaliyetlerden biri de 
mimari tasarım pratiğidir. Politik davranışın her türlü insan odaklı etkinlikte varlığı 
kaçınılmaz bir gerçekliktir. Politik davranışın işlevsel veya işlevsel olmayan sonuçları 
olabilir. Mimarların yüz yüze geldiği temel sorun, politik davranışın işlevsel olmayan 
sonuçlarını azaltmaya veya ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik olarak politik davranışı 
yönetmektir. Politik davranışı yönetmek mimari tasarım pratiğinde rol alan sosyal 
aktörlerin kullandıkları politik taktikleri anlamak ve tanımlamakla başlar. Bu tez 
kapsamında sunulan araştırma öncelikli olarak buna dayanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada nicel 
olarak araştırılan konular şunlardır: (1) herhangi bir inşaat projesinde birincil sosyal 
aktörler tarafından politik taktiklerin kullanımı (örneğin, müşteriler, ana-yükleniciler ve 
alt-yükleniciler), (2) sosyal aktörler tarafından politik içerikli mesajların gönderimi için 
kullanılan iletişim kanalları, (3) bir inşaat projesinin farklı aşamaları boyunca kullanılan 
politik taktiklerin yoğunluğu. Araştırma bulguları, politik taktiklerin mimari tasarım 
pratiğinde çok yaygın olarak kullanıldıklarını ve sosyal aktörler tarafından kullanılan bu 
politik taktiklerin en sık, inşaat sürecinde meydana geldiğini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. 
Ayrıca, araştırma bulguları sosyal aktörlerin politik amaçlı mesaj göndermek için, yazılı 
iletişim kanalları yerine sözlü iletişim kanallarını kullandıklarını ve mimari tasarım 
pratiğinde politik davranışları ağırlıklı olarak ana yüklenicilerin kullandıklarını ortaya 
koymaktadır.  
 
 Anahtar kelimeler: örgütsel politikalar, politik taktikler, politik davranış, 
Türkiye’de ki mimari tasarım ve inşaat pratiği. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Political behavior in organizations has been the subject of numerous studies 
(e.g., Mayes and Allen, 1977, Gandz and Murray, 1980, Kipnis et al., 1980, Mintzberg, 
1983, Ferris and Kacmar, 1992, Yukl and Falbe, 1991, Kacmar, 1993).  The emergent 
picture from these studies is that political behavior in organizations is an inevitable part 
of any human-based activity. Architectural design practice is one of those human-based 
activities. It is normally social actors (i.e., individuals, groups and/or organizations) 
who design and construct architectural design projects for other social actors. It is clear 
from this characteristic of the architectural design practice that social actors are the 
principal resource of any architectural design project. The social interactions among 
these social actors in architectural design practice and well known characteristic of 
construction industry jointly create a fertile ground for the emergence of political 
behavior. 
There is a rich but fragmented literature on political behavior.  As a direct result 
of fragmentation a lack of consensus on consequences of political behavior in 
organizations prevails in literature.  Some researchers argue that political behavior in 
organizations is dysfunctional (i.e., delays, conflict, employee turnover, lower 
productivity, cost overruns, low quality, unmet objectives, hostility, and reduced 
morale) (Kreitner and Kinicki, 1995, Sussman et al., 2002).  These scholars argue that 
political behavior in organizations should be eliminated.  On contrary some other 
researchers argue that political behavior is functional (i.e., achieving project goals, 
enhancing creativity and creating constructive power relationship) (Tjosvold, 1984, 
Ferris et al., 2000). These opposite views can be reconciled by acknowledging that 
consequences of political behavior can be functional or dysfunctional. 
Managing dysfunctional and functional consequences of political behavior in 
organization has been an important theme in organization studies literature for decades. 
There is strong evidence that this important theme will dominate academic research 
studies and minds of business practitioners and professionals for the years to come.   
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Managing functional and dysfunctional consequences of political behavior in 
architectural design practice is a key project management skill for architects and other 
social actors that operate in the construction industry.  It is obvious that managing 
dysfunctional affects of politically related behavior in architectural design practice starts 
with identifying and understanding political behavior. Yet the study on political 
behavior in architectural design practice is a neglected research area in construction 
project management literature. The research presented in this thesis paper explores this 
neglected research area for several reasons. 
First, construction project organizations are commonly conceptualized as socio-
technical system.  This conceptualization implies that construction projects should not 
only view as a technical system but also a sociological system. Yet technical system 
view of construction project dominates not only managerial thinking in construction 
practice but also graduate and undergraduate education of architects and civil engineers.  
Sociological view of construction project organizations is almost ignored by 
practitioners and academic researchers in Turkey. But a construction project 
organization is a nexus of social interactions.  Therefore social interactions should be 
well understood by social actors of construction project organizations. 
Second, previous research studies on political behavior focus on political 
behavior within boundary of an organization. Yet political behavior can extend the 
boundary of an organization such as in project organizations. Therefore studying 
political behavior across boundaries of organizations is a promising research area in 
literature.  Such a quest can provide important contribution not only general 
management literature but also construction management literature by providing 
important insight use of political behavior across boundaries of organizations in 
particular construction project organizations. 
 
1.1. Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of the research are five-fold. The first one is to identify the types 
of political behavior used by social actors in architectural design practice. The second 
one is to determine the frequency of political behavior observed in architectural design 
practice. The third one is to explore social actors’ (i.e., client, contractor, and sub-
contractor) frequency of use of political behavior. The fourth one is to reveal the 
communication channels used in sending political messages. The final one is to explore 
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the frequency of political behaviors in each sub-process (i.e., inception, design, 
construction) of an architectural design project.  
The scope of the research presented in thesis is confined by two criteria in order 
to ensure scientific validity of the research findings.  First criterion is domain selection.  
Construction project organizations are commonly carried out by a number of social 
actors such clients, architects, main-contractor and sub-contractors.  Architects 
operating in İzmir are the primary focus of this thesis.  Therefore research findings 
represent only the views of architects on political behavior commonly encountered in 
architectural design practice.  Second criterion is unit level of analysis.  The term social 
actor is used throughout the thesis refers individual, group, organization, and firm.  The 
unit level of analysis for the research is individual rather than group, organization and 
firm.  Using such unit level of analysis is consistent with previous research studies on 
political behavior (Allen et al., 1979, Sussman et al., 2002). 
 
1.2. Research Structure 
 
This research presented in this thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 
presents a succinct review of political behavior in organizations.  It also presents 
research objectives and the scope of the study. 
Chapter 2 presents an expanded and enhanced overview of literature which 
includes definition of political behavior in organizations (1) antecedents of political 
behavior (2) political behaviors, (3) consequences of political behaviors.  It also 
underlies the conceptual foundations for developing a research model. 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology used to achieve the objectives of 
thesis.  It consists of three sections data collection, sample and data analysis.  
Chapter 4 presents research findings of the questionnaire survey.  It presents 
demographic profile of surveyed architects, frequency of usage of political tactics and 
results of Chi-square test, Factor analysis and Friedman rank tests. 
Chapter 5 presents conclusion of the research findings and recommendations for 
future work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Political Behavior  
 
The concept of political behavior in organizational has been an important 
research area for more than three decades.  It has been addressed from a wide range of 
disciplines such as sociology, political science, psychology, human resources, and 
management.  Each discipline has its own assumptions, propositions and rules of 
evidence for studying political behavior in organizations.  Yet they jointly argue that in 
today’s business environment organizations are becoming more political entities 
(Mintzberg, 1983).  Therefore understanding political behavior in organization is the 
key issue that needs to be fully understood and manage. Understanding political 
behavior in organizations starts with defining what is meant by the term ‘political 
behavior.’ 
 
2.2. Definition of Organizational Politics  
 
The concept of political behavior in organizations is multi-dimensional concept.  
Defining a multi-dimensional concept is a major challenge facing any researcher that 
attempts to study it.  There are numerous definitions of political behavior in the 
literature.  These set forth definitions of political behavior should not be considered as 
conflicting but complementing each other because each definition focuses on a different 
dimension of political behaviors in organizations.  Furthermore, the term political 
behavior is interchangeable used with several other terms such as political process, 
organizational politics, political tactics, and company politics. 
Harvey and Mills (1970) define political process as any conflict over the 
allocation of scarce resources. 
Zaleznik (1970) defines political behavior as a competition for power and is a 
characteristic of all political structures (i.e., organizations). 
 5
Walmsley and Zald (1973) broaden the definition political process to include 
conflict over policy decision not just those relating allocation of scarce resources. 
Pettigrew (1973) defines company politics as the by play that occurs when one 
man or group of men want to advance themselves or their ideas regardless of whether or 
not those ideas would help company. 
Pettigrew (1973) argues that political behavior often involves restricting the 
information flow and is more often found in an uncertain environment. 
Allen et al. (1979) assert that “organizational politics involves intentional act of 
influence to enhance or protect the self interests of individuals or groups.”  
Cavanagh et al. (1981) argue that an important component of exerting influence 
is political behavior or organizational politics—defined generally as methods of 
acquiring power or gaining other types of advantage.  
Pfeffer (1981) defines political behavior as “activities taken within the 
organization to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one’s 
preferred outcomes in a situation where there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices.”  
Pfeffer (1981) defines organizational politics as ‘‘the study of power in action.’’ 
Farrell and Peterson (1982) argue that political behavior consists of those 
activities that are not required as a part of a social actor’s formal role in the 
organization, but that influence or attempt to influence distribution of advantages and 
disadvantages within the organization.  
Mintzberg (1983) defines organizational politics as ‘‘individual or group 
behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and above all in a 
technical sense, illegitimate—sanctioned neither by formal authority, accepted ideology, 
nor certified expertise (although it may exploit any one of these).’’ 
Tjosvold (1984) asserts that organizational politics includes conceptual political 
behaviors which relate influence actions strategically and often concerns with power 
and influence strategies. 
Gandz and Murray (1980) argue that political behavior is a pervasive reality in 
business and perceived as the most politicized organizational processes are those less 
formalized as not linked with rules. 
Gray and Ariss (1985) suggest that the process of organizational politics is said 
to consist of intentional acts of influence undertaken by individuals or groups to 
enhance or protect their self-interest when conflict courses of action are possible. 
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Drory and Romm (1990) argue that political behaviors are the observable and 
influencing behaviors which encourage for pursuing individuals’ or corporate goals and 
attempts of individuals, groups or organizations for influencing others.   
Ferris et al. (1989) define organizational politics as ‘‘a social influence process 
in which behavior is strategically designed to maximize short-term or long-term self-
interest, which is either consistent with or at the expense of others’ interests.’’ 
Greenberg and Baron (1997) suggest that organizational politics can be defined 
as ‘‘those actions not officially approved by an organization taken to influence others to 
achieve one’s personal goals’’ would appear to be an inevitable fact of organization life. 
Drory and Romm (1988) argue that political behavior is a power attainment and 
conflict which conceal motive. Dory and Romm (1990) suggest that “Political behavior 
is informal influence behaviors meant to influence the distribution of organizational 
resources when there are conflict interests between individuals or group in the 
organization.” 
Ferris et al. (2000) argue that organizational politics ‘‘involves an individual’s 
attribution to behaviors of self-serving intent, and can be defined as an individual’s 
subjective evaluation about the extent to which the work environment is characterized 
by co-workers and supervisors who demonstrate such self-serving behavior.’’ 
Witt et al. (2000) regards organizational politics as a ‘‘phenomena in which 
organizational members attempt either directly or indirectly to influence other members 
by means not sanctioned by formal standard operating procedures or informal norms, in 
an attempt to achieve personal or group objectives’’. 
Valle and Perrewe (2000) suggest that political behavior refers tactical influence 
by social actors which is specifically goal oriented actions to promote self- interests, 
either in support of other social actors’ objectives or disadvantage for others. 
Vigoda (2003) argues that political behavior refers the behavior of a social actor 
seeking for influence other social actors for the aim of promoting certain purposes and 
interests in the organization.   
Doldor (2007) defines organizational politics as to the existence of multiple 
competing interests within the organization and the influence processes enacted to 
manage them. 
The emerged themes from above succinct review of different definitions of 
political behavior and interchangeable words used to define political behavior include: 
(1) a lack of consensus prevails on its definition, (2) several terms such as 
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organizational politics, work politics and political process are interchangeable used to 
describe the phenomenon of political behavior, (3) researchers that adopt rationalist 
view argue that organizational politics are inappropriate, unethical, unacceptable, 
undesirable and dysfunctional, (4) researchers that adopt sociological view argue that 
political behavior are inevitable part of organize life, (5) political behavior can be used 
by social actors to achieve their self-interest(s), and (6) political behavior can be used 
by social actors to achieve organizational interest(s). 
The research presented in thesis propose that it is essential (1) to consider 
political behaviors as an inevitable part of architectural design practice, like any other 
business activity, (2) to differentiate political behavior that can lead dysfunctional 
outcomes from political behaviors that can lead functional outcomes, and (3) to 
understand and reduce dysfunctional outcomes of political behavior in architectural 
design practice.  Therefore a conceptual model that incorporates the emerged themes is 
required in order to achieve the objectives of the set forth in the Chapter I. The 
following section presents a conceptual model to study political behavior in 
architectural design practice. 
 
2.3. Political Behavior in Organizations 
 
Several conceptual models (Vrendenburgh and Maurer, 1984, Ferris et al., 1989, 
Buchanan, and Badham, 2008) have been proposed to study political behavior in 
organizations.  The most institutively appealing model for studying political behavior in 
organization is of Buchanan and Badham (2008). Buchanan and Badham’s (2008) 
conceptual model focuses on identifying the processes that underlies the political 
behavior in organizations.  It proposes that studying political behavior in organizations 
requires understanding its (1) antecedents, (2) behaviors, and (3) consequences of 
political behaviors (Figure 2. 1). 
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Antecedents 
Behaviors 
 
- Styles 
- Strategies 
- Tactics 
 
Consequences 
Individual 
Dysfunctional Functional 
Contextual 
 
Figure 2. 1. Political Behavior in Organizations 
(Adapted from Buchanan and Badham, 2008) 
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2.3.1. The Antecedent of Political Behaviors 
 
The antecedents of political behaviors in organizations are primarily driven by 
two main factors according to its triggers: (1) individual factors, and (2) contextual 
factors (Buchanan and Badham, 2008). 
 
2.3.1.1. Individual Factors 
 
Individual factors that drive political behaviors include psychological factors, 
age, gender, position and personal ambition. Cropanzo and Kacmar (1995) state that 
theoretical studies in the topic of individual factors which effects the organizational 
politics is based on three major groups: (1) communication skills, (2) Machiavellianism, 
and (3) the intent of the behavior. 
 
Communication skills 
The social actors may be verbally talkative in order to involve in the situation to 
assent to others point of view for the persuasion. The study which is conducted by Allen 
et al. (1979) shows that this connection between social actors in the organization. 
 
Machiavellianism 
Machiavellianism can be characterized as manipulation of other social actors 
which include control tendencies in order to conduct the other’s situational 
differentiations (Barbuto and Moss, 2006). Therefore, an actor who has high 
Machiavellian tendencies would be disposed to interact in a more political arena than 
other social actors. 
 
Intention and motivation 
Some researchers assume that the intent of an actor is the main reflection for 
determining the behaviors of social actors according to their outcomes (Drory and 
Romm, 1990).  Individual motivation also causes political behavior in organization.  
Motivation can be intrinsic or extrinsic.  Intrinsic motivation refers to motivation that 
comes from inner to succeed and “the energy source for performance comes from 
within” (Barbuto and Moss, 2006).  Extrinsic motivation defined as “the energy source 
for performance comes from others” (Barbuto and Moss, 2006). 
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2.3.1.2. Contextual Factors 
 
Political behaviors in organization are also triggered by contextual factors.  The 
contextual factors can include a wide range of issues. Previous research studies point 
out that the primary contextual factors that cause political behaviors in organizations 
include (1) environmental uncertainty, (2) environmental complexity, and (3) 
environmental munificence (Pinto, 2000, Kreitner and Kinicki, 1995).  
 
2.3.1.2.1. Environmental Uncertainty  
 
Environmental uncertainty can be defined as the perceived inability of social actors to 
predict changes in the environment, because of a lack of information or a lack of 
knowledge necessary to distinguish data (Milliken, 1987).  Environmental uncertainty 
in architectural design practice can be analyzed along two dimensions.  First dimension 
involves types of environmental uncertainty.  Three types of environmental uncertainty 
include (1) state uncertainty, (2) effect uncertainty, and (3) response uncertainty.  
State uncertainty addresses the overall unpredictability of the changing 
environment as viewed by the social actor. 
Effect uncertainty deals with the influence the unpredictability of the 
environment will have on the organization. Response uncertainty refers to the 
realization that the organization lacks the knowledge to respond to the uncertain 
environment and the inability to foresee the consequences of a response.  
Second dimension is related to the levels of environmental uncertainty.  Five 
levels of environmental uncertainty are (1) industrial uncertainty, (2) market 
uncertainty, (3) project uncertainty, (4) workplace uncertainty, and (5) uncertainty of 
site organization (Groak, 1992).  
 
Industrial uncertainty relates to such factors as, financial, material, and human 
resources available to the organization. The architectural design practice has to judge its 
resources in accordance to scarcity of resources. 
 
Market uncertainty exists in any business. The product of architectural design practice, 
the project, has characteristics with a few professional practices. The parties of the 
project may not know what will be the next contract, duration of contract involved, and 
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what technology and material will be required. Estimation is not an exact science and 
with two factors in particular make the relationship between expected cost and actual 
cost subject to uncertainty.  
 
Project uncertainty means that each new contract requires temporary organization to be 
established. Each project requires new design work and new production problems to be 
solved. 
 
Workplace uncertainty is another feature of the architectural design practice. The 
construction process involves a great deal of small jobs to be carried out in sequence. 
Each participant finds its workplace defined by the previous gang and the participant 
will define that of its successor. 
 
Uncertainty of site Organization stems from the variety construction process carried out 
by different parties that can be organized in different contractual combinations, on a 
day-to-day basis. 
 
Environmental uncertainty has been reported to be one of primary causes of 
political behaviors in organizations (Kreitner and Kinicki, 1995). Architectural design 
practice hosts higher environmental uncertainty. In the light of the above arguments it 
can be concluded that social actors involved in architectural design practice operate in 
highly uncertain environment. 
 
2.3.1.2.2. Environmental Complexity  
 
Environmental complexity refers to the proliferation and diversity of factors and 
issues, and participants. It involves complexities embedded in environment in which 
social actors operates.  Environmental complexity is commonly interpreted in terms of 
interdependency and fragmentation (Baccarini, 1996). Interdependency refers the 
degree to which project participants interact with and rely on other project participants 
for the information, materials, and resources needed to accomplish work for the project.  
Thompson (1967) distinguishes three different types of uncertainty: (1) pooled, (2) 
sequential, and (3) reciprocal interference.  Pooled interference refers to processes or 
activities that can be performed with little interaction between social actors.  Sequential 
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interdependence refers to processes or activities where output of a social actor becomes 
input of another social actor.  Reciprocal interdependent refers to processes or activities 
where an output of a social actor becomes input of other social actors in any direction.  
Sequential and reciprocal interdependence are considered as the most difficult types of 
interference.  These two most difficult interferences prevail in architecture design 
practice. 
Fragmentation refers to the number of separate units in an organizational system 
(Baccarini, 1996). Fragmentation in an organizational system can decomposed into 
three different types: horizontal, vertical and geographic fragmentation.  
 
1) Horizontal fragmentation occurs due to differences between social actors that 
carry out interdependent project activities.  The primary social actors (i.e., individuals, 
groups or organizations) of architectural design project are the client, the designer (i.e., 
the architect, the engineer), the main contractor, and the sub-contractor (Hua and Leen, 
2002). 
 
Client 
Client is a person who contributes in the design action, and is the sponsor of the 
construction project or design product. They can be categorized due to the experience 
level within architectural design practice (1) once in a lifetime; (2) inexperienced; (3) 
regular repeat; (4) experienced; (5) special. The client’s major decisions change with 
respect to the level of experience that he\she brings with. 
 
Clients may be private or from the public sector. The private clients are individuals, 
companies, or partnerships. The benefits of the private clients can be different, some of 
them built for their own and some built for renting, leasing etc. In the public sector, 
administrative directives are proceeding the design process with bidding procedure, 
construction contract, and supervision of design and construction. 
 
Architect / Engineer 
Architects and the engineers are the professionals who respond to different positions 
with respect to the client for whom the design is done. In the most common 
arrangement of the conventional system in Turkey, the architect is an independent firm 
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that considers the design under contract with the client or owner and partner with 
engineers. 
 
Main Contractor 
Main contractor is known as a prime contractor who brings together all elements and 
inputs of the construction into a coordinated action and considers total centralized 
responsibility for the construction and finished work. This system manages in 
accordance with contract documents which are signed by the owner of the construction 
project. According to the construction contract, the main contractor is completely 
responsible to the client for the effort of subcontractors and other sub-parties.  
 
Sub Contractor  
Sub-contractors are one of the primary suppliers of main contractors. They provide 
complementary resources (i.e., skills, knowledge, labor, etc.) to carry out complex and 
specialized construction operations. 
 
2) Vertical fragmentation occurs between different phases of architectural design 
project (Hua and Leen, 2002).   
 
Each architectural design project has a life cycle. The life cycle of an 
architectural design project can be divided into three processes: (1) conceptual process, 
(2) design process, and (3) construction process.  
 
Conceptual Process 
Institution of client’s need is the critical stage in any design project and where the 
client’s brief is formed. This is a complex process which is not straight forward, and it 
is also accommodating uncertainty. Ill-defined goals and misrepresentation of client 
needs are the primary sources of uncertainty. 
 
Design Process 
Communication and clarification between the client and the designer are the main parts 
of this process. The basic problems in the design process are based on a combination of 
two sets of knowledge gathered by the designer; the first one is knowledge of way 
project characteristics bear certain client-process, the second one is knowledge of 
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designing in order to transform the client’s needs and wishes into a build able product. 
Matching these knowledge and expectations can be based on some factors such as 
experience, background, and personality. 
 
Construction Process 
Construction process involves the transformation of designers’ abstract ideas into 
physical reality. Communication of these ideas into reality involves knowledge of 
different disciplines. 
 
3) Geographic fragmentation occurs because of physical separation of home 
office from construction site. 
 
Architectural design practice is one of oldest activities of human-being. The 
primary offering of this oldest practice is architectural design project. An architectural 
design project is a unique and non-repetitive enterprise which works against schedules 
and budgets to produce a specific result. Architectural design projects are commonly 
carried out by temporary alliances of organizations which carry out complex and 
interdependent tasks within time constraints. The architectural design practice hosts 
higher environmental complexity because each architectural design project is carried 
out by a multi-organization which is accommodated of independent experts (i.e., 
contractors, sub-contractors). They are independent in terms of their work which is 
sponsored. These experts ultimately spread, turn back to their own organizations or 
going on to a new project organization when the architectural design project is finished. 
Therefore such an organization is called multi-temporary organization (Cherns and 
Bryant, 1984). The organizational objectives are shaped experience disparities between 
two levels.  The first one, the project and the organizational temporary goals have been 
set up to achieve project objectives. These goals are related to constrain imposed by the 
client and environment in which the temporary organization will be realized. Second the 
constant objectives of the participants’ organization increase their domain, etc.  
Therefore architectural design project can be called multi-temporary organizations. 
Organizations that are involved in temporary alliances face two sets of 
conflicting objectives: (1) objectives of the temporary alliance which is achieving the 
objectives of the architectural design project, and (2) objectives of their permanent 
organizations (Morris and Hough, 1987). Implications of these conflicting objectives 
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evidence themselves in adversarial relationships which plague the architectural design 
practice. These relationships can have a profound influence on not only architectural 
design project performance but also on permanent organizations’ performance.   
The above-discussed characteristics of architectural design practice (i.e., 
presence of temporary alliances of organizations, uncertainty, fierce competition) 
coupled with social actors’ characteristics (i.e., personal values, self-interests, egos, 
needs, perceptions, goals methods, and objectives) jointly create a fertile ground for 
emergence of political behavior. 
In sum social actors involved in architectural design practice operate in highly 
complex environment. 
 
2.3.1.2.3. Environmental Munificence 
 
Environmental munificence refers to the scarceness or abundance of critical 
resources needed by the social actor or social actors operating within a particular 
environment (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Munificence indicates the environment’s ability to 
influence the survival and growth of social actors operating in that environment (Dess 
and Beard, 1984, Keats and Hitt, 1988, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Starbuck, 1976). 
Munificence provides social actors with high resource availability, easy access to 
necessary resources. In a high munificent environment, survival is relatively easy, social 
actors can pursue goals other than survival (Castrogiovanni, 1991), and social actors are 
not price taker – price of service or product is determined by social actor.  In a low 
munificence environment, resources are scarce and competition approaches perfect 
competition – profit margin is just above the costs, and primary goal of the social actors 
is survival.  Low munificence induces firms to seek ways to enhance resource 
accessibility and availability and in turn adversarial behaviors are common in such 
environment.  The architectural design firms operate in a low munificence environment.  
The competition in the architectural design practice approaches to perfect competition 
because architectural design firms are price taker. Therefore profit margins in 
architectural design practice are razor thin. Furthermore, the same arguments are also 
valid for main contractors and sub-contractors.  Social actors involved in architectural 
design practice operate in low munificence environment. 
Beeman and Sharkey (1987) use contextual factors, namely environmental 
complexity and environmental munificence, to build political behavior propensity map 
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to predict frequency use of political behavior in an organization.  A political behavior 
propensity map is a visual management tool.  It visualizes propensity of political 
behavior to emerge in an organization.  A political behavior propensity map is a two 
dimensional grid.  The horizontal axis (x-axis) of this grid indicates one of contextual 
factors and the vertical axis (y-axis) represents another of contextual factor.  Beeman 
and Sharkey (1987) propose two propensity maps by combing contextual factors (1) 
EM/EC map and (2) EM/EU map.  EM/EC map has two dimensions: (1) environmental 
munificence and (2) environmental complexity.  The horizontal axis represents 
environmental munificence whereas the vertical axis represents environmental 
complexity.  EM/EC map consists of four quadrants.  Each of the quadrants is a 
combination of environmental munificence and environmental complexity.  Quadrant I 
(low environmental munificence/low environmental complexity) indicates that social 
actors have moderate propensity to use political behavior to cope with challenges 
presented by the environment. Quadrant II (low environmental munificence/high 
environmental complexity) indicates that social actors in such environment have high 
propensity to use political behavior to achieve their objectives.  Quadrant III (high 
environmental munificence/high environmental complexity) indicates that social actors 
operating in environment have moderate propensity to use political behavior to manage 
their relationship with other social actors.  Quadrant IV (high environmental 
munificence/low environmental complexity) social actor operating in such environment 
have low propensity to use political behavior to manage their relationship with other 
social actors (Figure 2. 3). 
EU/EC map has two dimensions: (1) environmental uncertainity and (2) 
environmental complexity. The horizontal axis of EU/EC map represents environmental 
uncertainity and the vertical axis represents environmental complexity. The EU/EC map 
consists of four quadrants.  Each of the quadrants is a combination of environmental 
uncertainity and environmental complexity. Quadrant I (low environmental 
uncertainity/low environmental complexity) indicates that social actors have low 
propensity to use political behavior to cope with challenges presented by the 
environment. Quadrant II (low environmental uncertainity/high environmental 
complexity) indicates that social actors in such environment have moderate propensity 
to use political behavior to achieve their objectives.  Quadrant III (high environmental 
uncertainity/high environmental complexity) indicates that social actors operating in 
environment have high propensity to use political behavior to manage their relationship 
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with other social actors.  Quadrant IV (high environmental uncertainity/low 
environmental complexity) social actor operating in such environment have moderate 
propensity to use political behavior to manage their relationship with other social actors 
(Figure 2. 4). 
In addition to these two maps proposed by Beeman and Sharkey (1987), an 
alternative map (EU/EM) can be constructed by combing environmental uncertainity 
and environmental munificence.  The horizontal axis of EM/EU map represents 
environmental uncertainity and the vertical axis represents environmental munificence.  
The EU/EM map also consists of four quadrants.  Quadrant I (low environmental 
uncertainity/low environmental munificence) indicates that social actors have moderate 
propensity to use political behavior to cope with challenges presented by the 
environment. Quadrant II (low environmental uncertainity/high environmental 
munificence) indicates that social actors in such environment have low propensity to 
use political behavior to achieve their objectives. Quadrant III (high environmental 
uncertainity/high environmental munificence) indicates that social actors operating in 
environment have moderate to use political behavior to manage their relationship with 
other social actors. Quadrant IV (high environmental uncertainity/low environmental 
munificence) social actor operating in such environment have high propensity to use 
political behavior to manage their relationship with other social actors (Figure 2. 5). 
Social actors involve in architectural design practice operate in an environment 
that correspond to Quadrant II of EM/EC map – High Propensity, Quadrant III of 
EU/EC map – High Propensity and Quadrant IV of EU/EM map – High Propensity.  It 
is clear that social actor operating in architectural design practice have high propensity 
to use political behavior to achieve their objectives.  
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Figure 2. 3. Social Actor’s Propensity to Use Political Behavior and Environmental
Munificence and Complexity (Adapted from Beeman and Sharkey, 1987) 
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Figure 2. 4. Social Actor’s Propensity to Use Political Behavior and Environmental
Uncertainty and Complexity (Adapted from Beeman and Sharkey, 1987)
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2.3.2 Political Behavior 
 
Political behaviors in organizations can be studied at three different levels: (1) 
tactical level, (2) strategic level, and (3) style level (Overton and Frolick, 1996). The 
most commonly studied level of political behavior is tactical level followed by strategic 
level.  The least explored level of political behavior is style level.  Strategic and style 
levels of political behavior are still in their infancy stage of development.  Yet the 
research on tactical level of political behavior is on its maturity stage of development.  
It has received overwhelming interest from researchers mainly due to operational and 
immediate affect on organizational and project performance (Pinto, 2000). Furthermore, 
tactical level of political behavior constitutes the building block for studying and 
understanding upper levels of political behaviors.  In an other words strategic and style 
level of political tactics can not be understand without understanding and using tactical 
level political behavior.   
 
2.3.2.1. Tactics 
 
A tactic refers specific techniques for promoting a desired result distinguishing 
them from strategies is pertaining to a specific maneuvers rather than general plans. 
Tactics of political behavior can be divided into two groups: (1) Influence Tactics and 
(2) Political Tactics. 
 
2.3.2.1.1. Influence Tactics  
 
The influence tactics are subset of political behavior that are used by a social 
actor for influencing other social actor(s) to achieve organizational or common interests. 
The term influence can be defined as the intentional attempt to affect another to feel, 
think or behave in a desired fashion (Elron and Vigoda-Gadot, 2006).  Influencing 
people is one of the most important processes in effective management. Influence 
processes are important in organizations because they determine factors such as how 
decisions are made, how policies and strategies are implemented and decisions are taken 
successfully (Pfeffer, 1981), how motivated the team members will be to achieve the 
organization’s goals, and how much cooperation and support will be a significant part 
of the ways members interact with each other, how power holders attain support from 
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laterals without authority (Cohen and Bradford, 1989). Influence tactics is commonly 
confused with the concept of power. Therefore it is essential to differentiate the concept 
of power from influence tactics from concept of power. 
Influence tactics and power are important social mechanisms that affect one’s 
ability to manage social actors in order to achieve organizational goals or interests. 
Tjosvold (1984) argues that “power is an ability to get others to do what one does not 
want oneself.” The concept of power implies and commands compliance. The 
commonly accepted description of the term of influence includes that “ the ability of 
side A to change the behavior of side B without side B’s initial consent and without 
using sanctions is the actualization of power which expresses the influence of A on B” 
(Vigoda, 2003).  These definitions present the close link between influence tactics and 
power.  The connection that political behavior depends on power and everyone may not 
have a status or a stable base of power because it is not distributed equally among the 
social actors.  French and Raven’s framework (1959) suggests that each of social actor 
has available two distinct types of power: first one is power that based on our 
personality (personal power), and second one is power that derives from the position 
that person holds (positional or formal power).  
Influence tactics have been subject of numerous studies (Kipnis et al., 1980, 
Yukl and Fable, 1990). Several research have examined such topics as the types of 
tactics that power holders often use for influencing people and the intentions of their 
influence attempt. These researches have conceptualized influence tactics for achieving 
organizational interest using a number of different frameworks (e.g., Kipnis et al., 1980, 
Jones and Pittman, 1982, Wayne and Ferris, 1990, Yukl and Fable, 1990).  
The pioneering work of French and Raven (1959) presents an important 
milestone on influence tactics even though French and Raven (1959) do not use the 
term “the influence tactics”.  Kipnis et al (1980) developed a typology for how people 
influence each other in an organization.  The primary focus of their work is to identify 
social processes used by social actors to get others to do what they wanted.  The 
research findings of Kipnis et al. (1980) that are based on a factor analysis reveal eight 
influence tactics. These influence tactics are: (1) assertiveness, (2) ingratiation, (3) 
rationality, (4) sanctions, (5) exchange, (6) upward appeal, (7) blocking, and (8) 
coalition tactics. Kipnis et al.’s (1980) study provides important insights on how social 
actors behave to get their either superiors, laterals or subordinates to do something they 
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required.  It is the earliest empirical research study for identifying and classifying 
influence tactics. 
Arkin (1981) classifies influence tactics into two groups: reactive influence 
tactics and protective influence tactics. Reactive influence tactics include those actions 
that social actors follow in response to a perceived threat, in order to manage any 
personal damage which may come about or to forestall future negative outcomes. On 
the other hand, proactive influence tactics include those actions that social actors follow 
in response to a perceived opportunity, in order to influence an outcome in their behalf. 
Jones and Pittman (1982) propose a classification scheme for analyzing 
influence tactics.  The proposed classification scheme analyzes influence tactics under 
five main groups: (1) intimidation, (2) ingratiation, (3) self-promotion, (4) 
exemplification, and (5) supplication. Jones and Pittman’s (1982) study is the first 
research study that clearly distinguishes ‘self – promotion’ from ‘ingratiation’. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) use the research findings of Jones and Pittman’s 
(1982) study to develop a model for analyzing impression management behaviors.  
Tedeschi and Melburg’s (1984) model categorizes influence tactics on two dimensions: 
(1) assertiveness and, (2) time horizon.  Assertiveness dimension ranges from defensive 
influence tactic to assertive influence tactics.  Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) argue that 
defensive behavior is the result of the individual’s perceived need to defend against 
some threat, while assertive behavior is the result of the individual’s perceived need to 
take advantage of an opportunity which presents itself. Time horizon dimension ranges 
from short-term influence tactics to long- term influence tactics. 
Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) propose that influence tactics can be grouped into 
three groups: (1) hard tactics, (2), soft tactics and (3) rational persuasion.  Hard tactics 
include use of authority and these are pressure, legitimating tactics and some forms of 
coalition. Soft tactics include use of power sharing, ingratiation, consultation, 
inspirational appeals and personal appeals.  Rational persuasion includes only one item.   
Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990) use Kipnis et al.,’s (1980) classification scheme 
to explore influence tactics by a survey of MBA students in the U.S.  The research 
findings provide strong empirical support to validity of six of influence tactics of Kipnis 
et al. (1980) classification scheme.  The research findings also recommend omitting 
blocking and sanction influence tactics in order to enhance validity and reliability of 
research constructs. 
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Wayne and Ferris (1990) propose that individuals tend to use influence tactics in 
ways that can be classified as supervisor- focused, self-focused or job- focused 
impression management tactics in organizations.  Ingratiatory behaviors which are tend 
to make subordinates look helpful and considerable can be defined as supervisor-
focused tactics.  Exemplification behaviors which are tend to make individuals appear 
polite, nice and dedicated participant can be defined as self-focused tactics. Self-
promotive tactics which are tend to make subordinates look like more competent in 
organization define as job-focused tactics. 
Yukl and Falbe (1990) extend the original study of Kipnis et al. (1980) by 
incorporating changes proposed by Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990).  They suggest 
adding two influence tactics to the Kipnis et al. (1980) influence tactics list.  These two 
new influence tactics are inspirational appeals and consultation.  Inspirational appeals 
address the gap in charismatic and transformational leadership.  Consultation addresses 
the influence through involvement and participation. 
Schmidt and Yeh (1992) explore the cross-cultural validation of inventory of 
Kipnis et al. (1980) with supervisors and managers in Australia (n=126), England 
(n=121), Taiwan (n=2,231), and Japan (n=355). The research findings provide empirical 
support to the cross- cultural validation of eight influence tactics proposed by Kipnis et 
al. (1980). 
Yukl and Tracey (1992) and Yukl et al. (1993) combine two influence tactics, 
namely assertiveness and upward appeal, and propose a single pressure tactic called 
personal appeals to explore influence tactics used in organizations. 
Wayne and Linden (1995) propose a similar classification scheme proposed by 
Arkin (1981).  They suggest that influence tactics can be classified under two major 
groups: defensive influence tactics and assertive influence tactics.  Assertive influence 
tactics are further decomposed into self-focused or other focused influence tactics 
(Wayne and Liden, 1995). 
Sun and Bond (1999) propose a two factor model for classifying influence 
tactics: (1) contingent control and (2) gentle persuasion. 
Kennedy et al.’s (2003) study influence tactics propose a new classification 
scheme for exploring influence tactics.  This new classification scheme expands 
previous classification proposed in the literature by introducing new influence tactics 
such as collaboration, persistence, informal approach, gifting and socializing and 
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rationality. Rationality was further decomposed into three separate tactics: rational 
persuasion, written explanation, and appraising. 
Falbe and Yukl (1992) explore the effectiveness of influence tactics in 
organizations.  The research findings of Falbe and Yukl’s (1992) study suggest that the 
most effective tactics are soft tactics (i.e., inspirational appeals and consultation) and the 
least effective tactics are hard tactics (i.e., pressure, legitimating, and coalition). 
Furthermore their research findings also suggest that the effectiveness of combing 
different influence depends on what types of influence tactics are combined and 
effectiveness of influence tactics differ from each other (Falbe and Yukl 1992).  Falbe 
and Yukl (1992) conclude that combining a soft influence tactic with another soft 
influence tactic or with rational influence tactic is more effective than using a single soft 
influence tactic or a combination of hard influence tactics. They also conclude that 
using a single soft influence tactic that depends on personal power and power sharing is 
more effective than using a single hard tactic that depends on authority and positional 
power. 
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Table 2. 1. Influence Tactics  
(Source: Kipnis et al., 1980, Yukl and Fable, 1990) 
  
Tactics Definition 
  
Rational persuasion Using logical arguments and facts to persuade another 
that a desired result will occur 
Inspirational appeals Arousing enthusiasm by appealing to another’s values 
ideals, and aspirations, or by increasing the other’s 
self-confidence 
Consultation Asking for participation in decision making or 
planning a change when the other’s concerns and 
suggestions 
Ingratiation Using praise, flattery, and friendly or helpful behavior 
to get the other in a good mood or to think favorable 
of you; acting humbly and making the other person 
feel important 
Personal appeals Appealing to the other’s feelings of loyalty and 
friendship toward you when asking for something 
Exchange Offering an exchange of positive benefits or offering 
to make a personal sacrifice, indicating willingness to 
reciprocate at a later time, or promising a share of the 
benefits if the other helps accomplish a task 
Coalition Using the assistance of others or nothing their support 
to persuade the other to comply with desired goal 
Legitimating Pointing out one’s authority to make a request, or 
reiterating that it is consistent with organizational 
policies, rules, practices, or traditions 
 
 
(Cont. on next page) 
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Table 2. 2. (cont.) Influence Tactics  
(Source: Kipnis et al., 1980, Yukl and Fable, 1990) 
 
Assertiveness Demanding ordering and setting deadlines 
Pressure Seeking compliance by using demands, threats, 
frequent checking, or persistent reminders 
Sanctions Preventing or threatening to prevent benefits such as 
salary increases or job security 
Upward-appeal Causing additional pressure to conform by invoking 
the influence of higher levels in the organization such 
as making a formal appeal to higher levels or 
obtaining their informal support 
Blocking Attempting to stop the other from carrying out an 
action by activities such as engaging in a work 
slowdown or threatening to stop working with 
someone 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 3. Original Sets of Influence Tactics 
 
 
Influence 
Tactics  
 
Kipnis, Schmidt and 
Wilkinson (1980) 
 
Falbe and Yukl, 1992 
 
 1.Assertiveness 1.Rational Persuasion 
 2.Ingratiation 2.Inspirational Appeals 
 3.Rationality  3.Consultation 
 4.Sanctions 4.Ingratiation 
 5.Exchange  5.Exchange  
 6.Upward appeal 6.Coalition Tactics 
 7.Blocking 7.Pressure 
 8.Coalition 8.Legitimating Tactics 
  9.Upward Appeal 
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2.3.2.1.2. Political Tactics 
 
The political tactics are also subset of political behavior that are used by a social 
actor for influencing other social actor(s) to achieve self interest(s).  Political tactics 
used in organizations differ from influence tactics but they have close similarities. The 
research studies (Allen et al., 1979, Sussman et al., 2002) on political tactics follow an 
independent development path from research studies on influence tactics. Allen et al. 
(1979) argue that previous research studies concerned with behavior in organizations 
focus on a social actor’s reaction to other or events but proactive and initiating behavior 
is ignored. They also add that reactive behavior is intended to protect a social self 
interest while proactive behavior promotes self-interests. Therefore political tactic 
involves reactive and proactive behavior (Allen et al., 1979). 
The pioneering research study of Allen et al. (1979) marks a turning point on 
research studies on political tactics in organizations.  It is an exploratory research study 
that aims theory developing rather than theory testing.  The primary of focus Allen et 
al.’s (1979) study is identify political tactics used by social actors to “get what [they] 
need?”  Allen et al. (1979) propose that political tactics used by social actors can be 
categorized into eight groups: (1) attacking or blaming others, (2) using information as a 
tool, (3) creating a favorable image, (4) developing a base of support, (5) ingratiation, 
(6) forming power coalitions with allies, (7) associating with influential people and, (8) 
creating obligations.  
 
Attacking or Blaming Others. This behavior is often associated with blaming others for a 
problem or failure. It may also include trying to make a rival look bad by minimizing his or 
her accomplishments. 
 
Using Information as a Political Tool. This behavior may include withholding important 
information when doing so might further an employee’s political interests. This type of 
behavior can also include information overload. For example to bury or obscure important 
(but potentially damaging) details that the employee hopes go unnoticed. 
 
Creating and Maintaining a Favorable Image. This behavior includes drawing attention to 
one’s successes and successes of others, creating the appearance of being a player in the 
organization, and developing a reputation of possessing qualities considered important to 
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the organization. The behavior also includes taking credit for the ideas and 
accomplishments of others. 
 
Developing a Base of Support. Examples of this behavior include getting prior support for a 
decision before a meeting is called and getting others to contribute to an idea to secure their 
commitment. 
 
Ingratiation/Praising Others. This behavior includes praising others and establishing good 
rapport for self-serving purposes. Organizational jargon for this behavior includes 
“buttering up the boss,” and “apple polishing.” 
 
Associating with the influential persons. This behavior involves developing good quality of 
relationships with influential persons in organization and social situations 
 
Developing Power Coalitions/Strong Allies. This behavior includes developing networks of 
coworkers, colleagues, and /or friends within and outside the organization for purposes of 
supporting or advocating a specific course of action. 
 
Creating Obligations and Reciprocity. This behavior includes performing favors to create 
obligations from others, commonly known as, ‘You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.’ 
 
Allen et al. (1979) report that the first and second most commonly used political 
tactics are attacking or blaming other and use of information respectively. Furthermore, 
the research findings of Allen et al.’s (1979) study suggest that the seven and eight most 
commonly used political tactics are associating with influential persons and creating 
reciprocity and obligations respectively. They conclude that proactive political tactics 
include attacking others, creating a favorable image, developing a base of a support, 
ingratiation, and developing power coalitions and reactive tactics include using 
information as political tool, blaming others, and developing support.  Furthermore, 
they also conclude that higher-level managers tends to use more reactive political tactics 
than proactive ones such as attacking and blaming, coalition while lower-level 
managers tends to use often proactive political behaviors such as praising others and 
favor reciprocity. The research findings of Allen et al. (1979) suggest that (1) the choice 
of political tactics tends to change with respect to social actor’s hierarchy (2) a social 
actor’s choice of political tactics depends on various individual characteristics of the 
 30
participant, and (3) the mostly used political tactics are proactive ones, and third 
reactive political actions are more popular at lower levels of organization. It appears 
that vertical fragmentation influences social actor’s choice of political tactics. 
Du Brin (1988) explored the relationship between age and the choice of political 
tactics and hierarchy level of social actor and his/her choice for political tactics. He 
reports that younger and lower-ranking social actors have stronger prepotencity to use 
political tactics. 
Appelbaum and Hughes (1998) propose a conceptual framework for studying 
political tactics. They argue that political tactics used by the social actors in 
organizations include (1) forming coalitions, (2) impression management, (3) 
information management, (4) promote the opposition, (5) pursue line responsibility, (6) 
ingratiation and (7) devious political tactics. First six political tactics are similar to those 
proposed by Allen et al. (1979). The seventh one represents a number of devious 
political tactics such as ‘take no prisoners tactic’, ‘divide and conquer tactic’ and 
‘exclude the opposition’ (Appelbaum and Hughes, 1998).  The conceptual framework 
proposed in Appelbaum and Hughes’ (1998) study has not been empirically tested.   
Zanzi and O’Neil (2001) argue that there are two distinct categories of political 
tactics: sanctioned political tactics and non-sanctioned political tactics.  Sanctioned 
political tactics refers political tactics that social actors consider acceptable because they 
are part of organization’s norms (Zanzi and O’Neil, 2001).  On the other hand non-
sanctioned political tactics are the ones that social actors consider unacceptable and 
undesirable (Zanzi and O’Neil, 2001).  Social actors secretly perform non-sanctioned 
political tactics.  Zanzi and O’Neil (2001) propose that social actor use 24 political 
tactics.  Subsequently they conducted factor analysis to classify the proposed political 
tactics. The results of the factor analysis suggest that a two-factor solution is most 
appropriate for classifying the proposed political tactics. The first factor includes six 
political tactics: use of expertise, super-ordinate goals, image building, networking, 
persuasion, and coalition building. The second factor includes seven political tactics: 
intimidation and innuendoes, using surrogates, blaming or attacking, manipulation, 
organizational placement, co-optation, and control of information. Zanzi et al. (2001) 
label the first factor and second factor as non-sanctioned political tactics and sanctioned 
political tactics, respectively. 
Sussman et al. (2002) review classification scheme proposed by Allen et al. 
(1979) and argue that one of the original eight political tactics considerably overlaps 
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with another political tactic proposed in the classification scheme. Therefore they 
propose reducing the number of political tactics used by social actors from eight to 
seven. These seven political tactics proposed by Sussman et al. (2002) include (1) 
attacking or blaming others, (2) using information as a political tool, (3) creating and 
maintaining a favorable image, (4) developing a base of support, (5) ingratiation, (6) 
developing allies and forming power coalitions, and (7) creating obligations and 
reciprocity. Sussman et al. (2002) report that first and second the most frequently used 
political tactics include ingratiation and developing power allies/forming power 
coalitions respectively.  The least commonly used political tactic is using information as 
a tool. Sussman et al. (2002) conducted a factor analysis to classify political tactics. The 
results of the factor analysis suggest that seven political tactics can be classified into 
two categories: self focused tactics and relationship focused tactics.  First one includes 
attacking or blaming others, using information as a political tool, creating a favorable 
image. Second one includes developing a base of support, developing coalitions, 
creating obligations. The results of the factor analysis also suggest that ingratiation 
political tactic is a moderator for both political tactic categories and the most frequent of 
this political tactic can also be attributed to its moderator role.  
Sussman et al.’s (2002) study also provides two important additional insights on 
political tactics in organizations. First one is extension of Allen et al. (1979) findings 
that vertical fragmentation in an organization influences the choice of political tactics. 
Sussman et al. (2002) propose that not vertical fragmentation but also horizontal 
fragmentation influence the choice of political tactics. The research findings provide 
strong empirical support their proposition. Second one is the introduction of 
communication channels to research agenda of the political tactics. Sussman et al.’s 
(2002) political tactics are commonly carried out by using communication channels. 
Sussman et al. (2002) suggest that the communication channels used to send politically 
related messages can be classified into four major categories: (1) face to face, (2) 
telephone, (3) e- mail, (4) written. The research findings also provide empirical support 
to their proposition that communication channels influence the choice communication 
used in sending politically related messages.  
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Table 2. 4. Political Tactics According to Order of Occurrence 
 
 
Allen et al (1979) 
 
Zanzi et al. (2001) 
 
Sussman et al. (2002)  
1. Attacking or Blaming 
Others 
1. Use of Expertise 1. Ingratiation 
2. Use of Information 2. Persuasion 2. Developing Allies/ 
Forming Power 
Coalitions 
3. Image Building  3. Image Building 3. Developing a Base 
of Support 
4. Supporting Building 
for Ideas 
4. Networking 4. Creating a 
Favorable Image 
5. Praising Others, 
Ingratiation 
5. Super-Ordinate 
Goals 
5. Creating 
Obligations/ 
Reciprocity 
6. Power Coalitions, 
Strong Allies 
6. Coalition 
Building 
6. Attacking or 
Blaming Others 
7. Associating with the 
Influential Persons 
7. Control of 
Information  
7. Using Information 
as a Tool 
8. Creating Obligations/ 
Reciprocity  
8. Organizational 
Placement 
 
 9. Co-optation  
 10. Blaming or 
Attacking Others 
 
 11. Manipulation  
 12. Intimidation and 
Innuendoes 
 
 13. Using Surrogates  
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2.3.2.2. Political Strategies 
 
A political strategy refers a careful plan employing the political force to afford 
the maximum support toward a goal in an organization. “The strategy is characterized 
by the use of information and knowledge and is based on the influencer’s possession of 
expert and referent power. The strategy is based on increasing one’s influence with 
another through a hidden agenda of deliberate image and impression manipulation” 
(Overton and Frolick, 1996). 
Allen et al. (1979) propose that two major political strategies: proactive strategy 
and reactive strategy. The distinction between proactive and reactive strategies is a 
division between self-promotion and self-defense tendencies. 
Sussman et al. (2002) suggest that political strategies can be grouped as soft 
political strategy and hard political strategy. Soft political strategy involves use of 
flattery and ingratiation tactics. On the other hand hard political strategy involves use of 
forcing, sabotage. 
Jackson et al. (1994) argue that political strategies can be classified as (1) 
alliance building strategy and (2) aggressing strategy. First one includes relationship 
oriented political tactics such as ingratiation, developing coalitions, and associating with 
the influential. Second one includes power-brokering oriented political tactics such as 
using information as a political tool or attacking and blaming others. 
Fu et al.’s (2004) propose a three-factor model for classifying political strategies 
used in organizations. The proposed political strategies are persuasive strategy, 
relationship-based strategy, and assertive strategy. Persuasive strategy includes three 
influence tactics: rational persuasion, inspiration appeal, and consultation. Assertive 
strategy is composed of three influence tactics persistence, pressure, and upward appeal. 
Finally the relationship-based strategy includes five influence tactics gifting, informal 
engagement, personal appeal, socializing, and exchanging. 
 
2.3.2.3. Political Styles 
 
The use of political tactics and political strategies over time reveals a social 
actors political style. Political style is different from political strategy.  Political strategy 
is moderate-term or situational.  On contrary political style reflect preference of a social 
actor using a specific favored mix of political tactics and strategies (Overton and 
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Frolick, 1996). There are several models (e.g., Kipnis and Schmidt, 1988; 1996, Pinto, 
2000) for classifying political styles used by individual in organizations.   
Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) propose four major political styles: (1) shotgun, (2) 
ingratiatory, (3) tactician, and (4) bystander. Shotgun political style includes individuals 
that are extremely political and primarily use threating and bargaining tactics. 
Ingratiatory political style involves individuals that are highly political and use 
ingratiating and creating favorable image tactics. Tactician political style includes 
individuals that are moderately political and rely on competence, logic, reason, and use 
information as a political tool. Bystander political style include individual that are 
minimally political and use a few political tactics. Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) explore 
effectiveness of each political style and conclude that tactician political style 
outperforms other political styles.  
Pinto (2000) classifies political styles of social actors in to three main groups: 
(1) sharks, (2) naive, and (3) sensible. 
 
Sharks 
Pinto (2000) argues that shark individual eagerly adopt political tactics and 
consider them as an opportunity to maximize their self-interest. The favorite political 
tactics used by shark individuals include using information as tool, developing allies/ 
forming power coalitions, attacking and blaming others. 
 
Naive 
Naive individuals view political tactics unpleasant and unnecessary. They 
consider that political tactics in organizations should be eliminated or avoided at all 
costs. The favorite political tactics of naive persons is “tell it like it” - do nothing. 
 
Sensible 
Sensible individuals believe that political tactics are inevitable part of 
organizational life. They consider political tactics as necessary for achieving 
organizational interest. The favorite political tactics of sensible individuals are 
networking, developing a base of support, and creating obligations and reciprocity. 
Pinto (2000) argues that shark and naive individuals represents polar points of a 
continuum and neither of shark or naive individual meet today’s realities of project 
organizations.  He argues that sensible individuals represent the middle point of this 
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continuum and sensible individuals are the most suitable political style for meeting the 
challenges of business world. 
 
2.3.3. Consequences of Political Behavior 
 
The research studies on consequences of political behavior provide inconsistent 
results. Some research studies report that political behavior has dysfunctional 
consequences such as conflict, employee turnover, stress, job anxiety, job 
dissatisfaction, employee turnover, lower productivity, cost overruns, low quality, 
unmet objectives, hostility, and reduced morale (Kreitner and Kinicki, 1995, Sussman et 
al., 2002). Some other research studies report that political behavior can have functional 
consequences (Tjosvold, 1984, Ferris et al., 2000). It should be noted that political 
behavior becomes dysfunctional, unethical, and unacceptable when employees’ self-
interests erode or defeat organizational interests. Therefore achieving a balance between 
employees’ self-interests and organizational interests is a key issue facing managers of 
today’s construction project organizations. 
The research presented in this thesis builds on premise that managing 
dysfunctional consequences of political behavior starts with understanding it. The 
preceding sections laid down the conceptual foundations for developing a research 
model that can guide us to better understand political behavior in construction project 
organization. The research model proposed in this thesis for exploring political behavior 
in construction project organizations is presented in Figure 2.7. It conceptualizes 
political behavior in construction project organizations as “a tug of wars” between “self 
interest” and “project interest.” Social actors (i.e., clients, architects, subcontractors, and 
main contractors) commonly use political tactics to maximize their self-interest.  
Dysfunctional consequences of political tactics can be balanced by using influence 
tactics. “Tug of wars” in construction project organization is a dynamic process. It 
changes throughout the life-cycle of the project.  Furthermore, social actors use 
different communication channels for sending politically motivated messages. 
Thus far, political behavior in organizations are discussed and categorized and 
consequences of political behavior are reported.  The following section presents 
research methodology of the thesis. 
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Social Actors of 
Multi-
Temporary 
Organizations 
 
Architect 
Main Contractor 
Subcontractor 
Client 
 
 
Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence 
tactics 
 
Political 
tactics 
 
 
 
Project 
Objectives 
Political Behavior
 
 
Self 
interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 5. Styles of Political Behavior  
(Source: Pinto, 2000) 
 
 
Characteristics Naive Sensible Sharks 
Underlying Attitude 
“Politics is…” 
Unpleasant Necessary An opportunity 
Intent  Avoid at all costs Used to further 
project’s goals 
Self-serving and 
predatory 
Techniques Tell it like it is Network, expand 
connections, use 
system to give and 
receive favors 
Manipulation, use 
of fraud and deceit 
when necessary 
Favorite Tactics None, the truth will 
win out 
Negotiation, 
bargaining 
Bullying, misuse of 
information, 
cultivate and use 
‘friends’ and other 
contacts 
 
Figure 2. 7. Tug of War Between Self Interest and Project Objectives  
(Adapted from: Kreitner and Kinicki, 1995) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters presents conceptual domain of the research. This chapter 
presents research methodology used to explore use of political tactics in architectural 
design practice.  It is organized into three sections: (1) data collection (2) sample and 
(3) data analysis - overview of the statistical methods used in the thesis. 
 
3.2. Data Collection 
 
Data collection method used in the thesis questionnaire survey. The rationale 
behind this choice is two-fold. First, previous research studies (Allen et al., 1979, 
Sussman et al., 2002) in literature commonly use questionnaire survey to explore 
political tactics used by social actors. Second, research on political behavior in 
organizations is in its maturity stage of development. Therefore, exploring use of 
political behavior in architectural design practice is theory testing rather than theory 
building research. It is well documented in the literature that questionnaire survey 
should be the first choice for theory testing research studies. 
Questionnaire survey method, like any other research methods, has strengths and 
weaknesses. The major strength of questionnaire survey is generalizability of the 
research findings. Using questionnaire survey as a research method ensured the 
generalizability of the research findings presented in this thesis. The major weakness of 
the questionnaire survey method is reliability in data collection. Reliability in data 
collection stage of the research presented in thesis was ensured and improved by 
following the recommendations and guidelines suggested by previous research studies 
(Sussman et al., 2002, Zanzi and O’Neill, 2001) to design the survey instrument and 
conducting a pilot study. A pilot study is a preliminary and a small scale study that is 
conducted to identify potential deficiencies of the survey instrument and to address 
these potential deficiencies before time and resources are spelling on a large scale study. 
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The pilot study was conducted to control readability and clarity of the survey 
instrument. 25 graduate students registered to Engineering Management program at 
İzmir Institute of Technology participated the pilot study. Survey instrument was 
revised in the light of the feed back received from participants. The data collected in 
pilot study was not used for any further analysis. 
The questionnaire used to collect data for exploring use of political tactics in 
architectural design practice consists of four parts. The first part of the questionnaire 
solicits information on demographics of participants (i.e., gender, age, position, 
establishment year of the firm, and number of employees). It includes open-ended, 
Likert type-scale, and ranking questions. 
The second part of the questionnaire includes a series of questions regarding 
political behavior in architectural design practice. In this part of the questionnaire, the 
participants are asked to respond to politically-related messages that they received 
rather than they send. The rationale behind using such wording is the fact that the 
questionnaire aims soliciting sensitive information regarding usage of political 
behaviors and participants may avoid  that may be perceived as socially undesirable 
(Sussman et al., 2002). 
In the third part of questionnaire, the participants are asked to rank (1) 
communication channels used by the social actor for politically motivated messages, (2) 
the political behavior that they receive in their day to day activities, (3) frequency of 
political behavior that they experience through out the project life cycle. 
In the last part of the questionnaire, the participants are asked to define the age 
of the social actors that they often receive politically-related messages. 
 
3.3. Sample 
 
The sample used to collect data on use of political tactics in architectural design 
practice is composed of architects those participated “Consultation Council of 
Independent Architects” seminar organized by İzmir branch of Chamber of Turkish 
Architects.  The major themes of the seminar were to (1) discuss the problems that 
plague architectural design practice and (2) present to participants alternative ways to 
overcome these problems. The architects those attended to the seminar were kindly 
requested to participate the survey. 
 
 39
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis techniques used in this thesis include (1) Factor Analysis, (2) Chi-
Square Test, and (3) Friedman Test. A commercial statistical analysis package SPSS 13 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) by SPSS Corporation was used to conduct 
the statistical tests. 
 
3.4.1. Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis is an analysis model that can be used to examine a wide range of 
variables. It is a statistical tool which is used to evaluate the patterns of relationship 
between a large number of variables. Factor analysis assumes that all the variables on 
different attributes could be reduced down to a few important dimensions which are 
called factors. This reduction is possible even if those independent data sets were not 
measured directly. The primary aim of the factor analysis is discovering tendencies 
about the nature of the independent variables that affect them (Gorsuch, 1983). 
 
3.4.2. Chi-square test 
 
It is an evaluation model based on a frequency distribution of certain events 
occurred in a sample. The events considered must be an outcome of a categorical 
variable which are independent for each other and they must be mutually exclusive. 
Events total probability has to be 1. It is a test of independence estimations which are 
expressed in a contingency table. It is the measurement of how far the observed counts 
in these two variables are different from the expected counts (Plackett, 1983). 
 
3.4.3. Friedman Test 
 
The Friedman test is a non-parametric test used to compare observations 
repeated on the same subjects that tests the difference between several related samples. 
It examines randomized block analysis of variance. It is also a comparison of column 
effects in a two-way layout. The examination procedure includes ranking each row 
together, then counting the values according to ranks by columns (Sidney and Castellan, 
1988). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research findings of the thesis. It starts with presenting 
demographic information of participants. Subsequent sections present use of political 
tactics, communication channels, social actors’ most and likely political tactics, use of 
political tactics in different stages of construction projects, Chi-Square test results, 
Factor Analysis results and Friedman Ranking test results. 
A total of 180 architects participated, 57 questionnaire forms were discarded for 
leaving blank sections or otherwise not following instructions, and 22 forms were not 
turned back. The results reported in this thesis are based on the responses of 101 
architects. In terms of gender, the sample is 33% female and 67% male. The age profile 
of the participants is presented in Figure 4. 1 Majority of participants (75%) are at age 
range of 31-50 years old. Figure 4. 2 presents age profile of architectural design 
offices/firms. The average age of architectural design firms/offices is reported in. Figure 
4. 2 suggest that age of survey architectural design firms/offices ranges from 1971 to 
2008. Most of the design firms/offices were established in the years between 1990–2000 
(41%) and 37% of the design firms/offices were established between the years 2000-
2008. The size of architectural designs/offices was measured by number of full-time 
employees. Figure 4. 3 presents age profile of surveyed architectural design 
offices/firms. 19% of architectural design offices/firms have no employee other than 
architect, 25% of the design offices have only one employee working with architect and 
23% has 2 employees, 19% has 3 employees, and only 1% of the architectural design 
firm/offices have 10 or more employees (Figure 4. 3). 
 
4.2. Frequency of Political Tactics 
 
Table 4. 1 presents means and standard deviations of political tactics used by the 
participants in architectural design practice. Standard deviation values show the 
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variation in data (i.e., degree of agreement/disagreement between the social actors). For 
example creating a favorable image tactic is ranked 1st by a general consensus among 
social actors (i.e., with standard deviation of 1.48). On the other hand creating 
obligations/reciprocity is ranked on 4th order with less agreement (i.e., with standard 
deviation of 1.68).  
It is clear from Table 4. 1 that the most commonly used political tactic in 
architectural design practice is creating a favorable image.  The second and third most 
frequently used political tactics are ingratiation, and attacking or blaming others, 
respectively. Table 4.1 also suggests that the least commonly used political tactic in 
architectural design practice is developing allies/power coalitions. The main factor 
underlies the least frequent use of developing allies/power coalitions might be the fact 
that developing allies/ power coalition requires a complex set of relations and 
organization along with a strong teamwork. Yet participating architects may lack these 
qualities, they may not be able to develop allies and coalitions as political behaviors. On 
the other hand, creating a favorable image and ingratiation do not require complex 
organization and teamwork, therefore participating architects might frequently use them 
easily by their very own effort. 
The research findings on use political tactics in Turkish architectural design 
practice differ from previous research studies on use of political tactics (e.g., Allen et 
al., 1979, Sussman et al., 2002). Allen et al.,’s (1979) study report that the most 
commonly used political tactic in the U.S. organizations is attacking or blaming others 
and the least commonly used political tactic is creating obligations and reciprocity.  
Furthermore, the research findings of Sussman et al.,’s (2002)  study reveal that the 
most frequently used political tactic in the U.S. organizations is ingratiation and the 
least commonly used  political tactic is using information as a political tool. These 
inconsistent research findings can be explained by a number of factors. First, these 
research studies (e.g., Allen et al., 1979, Sussman et al., 2002) were carried out in 
different times. Contextual factors (i.e., environmental complexity, environmental 
uncertainty and environmental munificence) tend to change over the years. It should be 
noted contextual factors since both research studies conducted have significantly 
changed. Second, previous research studies (e.g., Allen et al., 1979, Sussman et al., 
2002) were conducted in the U.S. Yukl et al. (2003) argue that cross-cultural differences 
could influence frequency of use of political tactics. Political behaviors of the social 
actors mainly depends on their cultural circumstance and each social actor reflects 
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cultural values and traditions while interact with other social actors. If culture is a 
moderator for the relationship between political tactics and its social actors then it is 
possible that the emergence of different tactics in different cultures might be considered 
natural (Yukl et al., 2003). Third, unit level of analysis of previous research studies is 
political tactics within boundaries of organizations. Yet, the research findings reflect 
perceived use of political behavior across organizational boundaries (i.e., architectural 
design office and construction firms including main contractor and sub-subcontractor). 
These three factors might have jointly influenced the research findings of the research 
presented in this thesis.  
The research findings highlight that frequency in use of political tactics is not 
significantly related individual factors (i.e., gender and age) and organizational factors 
such as (i.e., size of architectural design office measured by number of employees and 
age of architectural design firm measured by the number of years passed since its 
establishment). On contrary, the research findings reveal significant differences in use 
of political tactics behavior of different primary social actors of architectural design 
practice. 
 
4.3. Direction of Political Tactics According to Social actors 
 
Table 4. 2 presents the use of political behavior in architectural design practice 
by subcontractors, contractors and clients. Table 4. 2 clearly shows that ingratiation is 
less frequently used by main contractors. Furthermore, clients commonly prefer using 
political tactic of attacking or blaming others in the architectural design practice. The 
most frequent use of this political behavior can be explained by their bargaining power 
in the architectural design practice. 
Table 4. 3 presents the most and least likely political behaviors used by 
subcontractors, main-contractors, and clients.  The most common political behavior 
used by subcontractors is ingratiation. On the other hand the most common political 
behavior used by main contractor is creating a favorable image.  
It is interesting to note that clients’ and subcontractors’ preferences for using 
political tactics are almost virtual mirror images of each other (See Table 4. 3). Most 
likely political tactics used by clients are the least likely political tactics used by 
subcontractors.  
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Furthermore, ingratiation is one of the most likely used political tactics of 
subcontractors but it is least likely used political tactic used of main contractors. The 
likely/unlikely political tactics of main contractors is not same as either clients’ or 
subcontractors’ behaviors. Each social actor has its own unique set of likely/unlikely 
political tactics (Table 4. 4 ). 
Table 4. 4 presents the total usage frequency of political behavior by 
subcontractors, main-contractors and clients. It summarizes the counts for 101 subjects 
across the political tactics. Contractors have the highest usage frequency of political 
behavior followed by subcontractors and clients. This finding can be explained by a 
closer look to the conventional construction delivery method (Figure 2. 6). The 
conventional delivery is the most commonly used delivery method by Turkish clients to 
construct buildings. The conventional delivery method creates two types of 
relationships: contractual relationships and functional relationship. Architects and main 
contractor have both contractual relationships with client. Yet architects and main 
contractor have only functional relationship but not contractual relationship. This 
functional relationship fuels use of political tactics by main contractor against to 
architects because neither of the social actors have power or authority over each other. 
The main contractors have the highest frequency (46%) in using political tactics.  
The clients have the lowest frequency (19%) in using political tactics. This can 
be attributed to fact that in conventional delivery method client have contractual 
relationship that with architects that enable him/her to exercise power and authority to 
manage relationships with architects.  
These findings are consistent with previous research studies (Sussman et al., 
2002, Falbe and Yukl, 1992) that conclude power and authority of the social actors are 
negatively related with their use of political tactics. The research findings also provide 
empirical support to Allen et al.’s (1979) argument that the choice of political tactics 
usually depends on social actor’s hierarchical position in the organization. 
A chi-square test is conducted for independence between social actors and 
political tactics.  The rationale behind this test is to explore empirically the relationship 
between social actor and social actor’s choice of using political tactics.  A chi-square 
test statistics of 38.06 is obtained based on 12 degrees of freedom with a p-value of 
0.001. Table 4. 5 presents the results of chi-square test results.  It becomes evident from 
Table 4. 5 that there is a strong relation between political tactics and the choice of 
political tactics by social actors. 
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4.4. Direction of Political Tactics According to Communication 
Channels 
 
Table 4. 6 presents communication channels used by social actors for sending 
politically motivated messages.  It becomes clear from Table 4. 6 that the most common 
communication channel used in sending politically related behavior is face to face 
(73%), followed by telephone (24%). Social actors infrequently use memo/letter (2%) 
and e-mail (1%) for sending politically motivated messages.  It also becomes evident 
that the social actors use oral communication channels rather than written 
communication channels in sending politically motivated messages. This might be 
explained by the culture, since the culture itself does not promote written exchange of 
ideas at all. On the other hand, a written document can be used against a social actor in 
a court. Therefore social actor intentionally might prefer verbal communication over 
written one in sending politically motivated messages. 
Table 4. 7 presents a cross tabulation of communication channels versus political 
tactics. The research findings reveal that face to face communication channel is most 
likely used for ingratiation and creating obligations/reciprocity tactics. The research 
findings also suggest that face to face communication channel is most unlikely used for 
developing a base of support and attacking or blaming others. Furthermore, it appears 
that telephone is most unlikely used for developing a base of support and attacking or 
blaming others. 
A chi-square test was conducted to explore the relationship between political 
tactic and type of communication channel used in sending politically related messages. 
The results of chi-square test are presented in Table 4. 9.  The chi-square test for 18 
degrees of freedom results a test statistic of 39.39 with a p-value of 0.003. This result 
indicates that there is a reasonable relation between tactics used by social actors and 
communication channels. 
Table 4. 8 presents the usage frequency and percentage of political tactics and by 
communication channel. It is clear from the Table 4. 8 that social actors predominantly 
use face to face communication for sending politically motivated messages.  Its usage 
percentage is nearly three times more than telephone communication. Therefore, the 
oral communication channels in particular face to face are the most commonly used for 
sending politically related messages. This ordering for direction of the political tactics 
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according to communication channels is in-line with the findings of Sussman et al.,’s 
(2002) research study. 
 
4.5. Direction of Political Tactics According to Project Life Cycle 
 
Table 4. 10 provides frequency of political tactics experienced throughout 
project life cycle.  It is evident from Table 4. 10 that political tactics are most 
commonly used in the construction process, followed by the design process. Table 4. 10 
presents a cross tabulation of project life-cycles versus political tactics.  
Table 4. 11 presents the most likely and the least likely political behavior for 
each sub-process. The most commonly used political behavior in the construction 
phases are attacking or blaming others and using information as a tool. Another 
prominent feature of Table 4. 11 is that the political tactics used in conceptual phase and 
construction phase are virtual mirror images of each other with respect to likely 
/unlikely behaviors used in processes. These two most likely political tactics used in 
construction phase are two unlikely behaviors used in conceptual phase and one of the 
most likely political tactics used in conceptual phase is one of the unlikely political 
tactics used in construction phase. 
Table 4. 12 presents overall usages of political tactics in each sub-process. There 
is overwhelming evidence that political tactics are very common in the construction 
process. The political tactics experienced in this process is significantly higher than 
those (experienced) in the conception and design processes. It might be explained as in 
these two phases (i.e., conception and design) the dominant social actor is architect who 
can make decisions alone. On the other hand, the contractual relationships may be one 
of the important factors in construction organizations that triggers use of political tactics 
in the construction process. Increasing number of social actors in the construction stage 
also fuel use of political tactics. Each of the social actor has no positional power to 
involve in decision making process because of the hierarchy in conventional 
construction system organization (Figure 2. 6). 
A chi square test was conducted in order to understand whether project life 
cycles and political tactics are dependent or independent.  The chi-square test for 12 
degrees of freedom produced a test statistics of 45.35 with a p-value less than 0.001. 
This test result suggests that there is statistical relationship between project life-cycles 
and political tactics. 
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4.6. Factor Analysis 
 
A factor analysis was conducted on the frequency of the use of the seven 
different political tactics according to occurrence of these tactics in architectural design 
and construction practices. In this analysis principal component analysis is used with 
varimax rotation. The rationale behind using factor analysis is reducing seven political 
tactics down to a few important dimensions which are called factors. 
The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 4. 14. Table 4.14 suggests 
that seven political tactics could be represented by two factors. The first factor includes 
three political tactics. These political tactics are attacking or blaming others, 
ingratiation, and creating obligations/ reciprocity. Attacking or blaming has a very high 
loading (0.87). Ingratiation and creating obligations have factor loadings of 0.636 and 
0.561, respectively. The high factor loading of attacking or blaming others suggests that 
it is the pure construct for the first extracted factor. Therefore the first extracted factor is 
labeled as ‘focus on one to one relationship’.   
The second factor includes four tactics. These four political tactics are 
developing allies/ coalition, creating a favorable image, developing a base of a support, 
and using information as a political tool. Developing allies/ coalition has highest 
loading in this factor. It dominates other political tactics of this factor. Therefore the 
second factor can be labeled as ‘focus on multiple relationship’.  
Ingratiation and creating obligations/reciprocity have factor loadings of 0.406 
and 0.424, respectively. These factor loadings are slightly below commonly accepted 
threshold level of 0.50. These results suggest that ingratiation and creating 
obligations/reciprocity have also moderate loadings in the second factor. It appears that 
ingratiation and creating obligations/reciprocity have dual role in architectural design 
practice. 
First factor appears to speculate the darker and negative side of the political 
tactics.  Ingratiation and creating reciprocity tactic can serve not only for ‘focus on one 
to one relationship’ behavior but also for or ‘focus on multiple relationship’. 
 
4.7. Friedman Test Results for Frequency Ranking 
 
Table 4. 15 presents mean and median values and Friedman Test results for 
frequency ranking of political tactics used in architectural design practice. Developing 
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allies/coalitions has the highest frequency ranking value. Yet the results of the Friedman 
ranking test suggest that the frequency ranking of political tactics used in architectural 
design practice is not consistent among surveyed architects. 
Table 4. 16 presents mean and median values, and Friedman Test results for 
frequency ranking of communication channels used in sending politically related 
messages. Face to face has the highest frequency ranking. Its mean and median values 
are smaller than those of other communication channels. Yet the results of the Friedman 
ranking test suggest that frequency ranking of communication channels used in sending 
politically related messages is not consistent among participants. 
Table 4. 17 presents the mean and median values and Freidman test results for 
frequency ranking of political tactics in different stages of a construction project. 
Construction stage has the highest frequency ranking. Its mean and median values are 
smaller than those of other stages of construction projects. The results of Friedman test 
again is not statistically significant suggesting that there is no consensus among 
surveyed architects on ranking of which project stage social actors use political tactics.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1. Age Profile of Architects Surveyed 
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Figure 4. 3. Number of the Employees 
 
 
Figure 4. 2. Establishment Years of the Firms 
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Table 4. 1. Statistics of Political Tactics 
 
 
Political Tactic mean* s.d. 
Creating a favorable image 4.21 1.48 
Ingratiation 3.91 1.73 
Attacking or blaming others 3.72 1.59 
Creating obligations/ reciprocity 3.57 1.68 
Using information as a tool 3.37 1.51 
Developing a base of support 3.29 1.64 
Developing allies/ coalitions 2.96 1.56 
*1 = infrequently;   7 = frequently   (s.d.: standard deviation) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 2. Political Tactic vs. Social Actors 
 
 
Social Actors Political Tactic 
Subcontractor Main 
Contractor 
Client 
Creating a favorable image 31 54 16 
Ingratiation 52 33 16 
Attacking or blaming others 30 40 31 
Creating obligations/ reciprocity 35 52 14 
Using information as a tool 34 52 15 
Developing a base of support 23 52 26 
Developing allies/ coalitions 42 46 13 
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Table 4. 3. Social Actors and Likely/Unlikely Political Tactics 
 
 
Political Tactics Social actors 
Most likely Political Tactics Least likely Political Tactics 
Subcontractor Ingratiation Developing a base of support 
 Developing allies/ coalitions Attacking or blaming others 
   
Client Attacking or blaming others Developing allies/ coalitions 
 Developing a base of support Creating obligations/ 
reciprocity 
   
Main contractor Creating a favorable image Ingratiation 
 Creating obligations/ reciprocity Attacking or blaming others 
 
 
Table 4. 4. The Usage of Political Tactics by Social Actors 
 
Social actors Frequency Percent 
Subcontractor 247 35% 
Client 131 19% 
Main contractor 329 46% 
 
 
Table 4. 5. Chi-Square Test for Social Actors 
 
 
Value (X) 
Degrees of 
freedom (df) 
Asymp. 
Significance 
Level (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 38.06 12 0.001
Likelihood Ratio 36.85 12 0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.96 1 0.005
N of Valid Cases 707    
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Table 4. 6. Political Tactics vs. Channel 
 
Channel Political Tactic 
Face to Face Memo/Letter Telephone E-mail
Creating a favorable image 80 3 16 2 
Ingratiation 84 1 16 0 
Attacking or blaming others 65 0 35 1 
Creating obligations/ reciprocity 81 1 19 0 
Using information as a tool 71 3 24 3 
Developing a base of support 60 1 36 4 
Developing allies/ coalitions 73 4 23 1 
 
 
 
Table 4. 7. Channel and Likely/Unlikely Political Tactics 
 
Political Tactics Channel 
Most likely behaviors Least likely behaviors 
Face to Face Ingratiation Developing a base of support 
 Creating obligations/ reciprocity Attacking or blaming others 
   
Memo/Letter Creating a favorable image Attacking or blaming others 
 Developing allies/ coalitions  
   
Telephone Developing a base of support Ingratiation 
 Attacking or blaming others Creating a favorable image 
   
E-mail  Developing a base of support Creating obligations/ reciprocity 
 Using information as a tool Ingratiation 
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Table 4. 8. The Usage of Political Tactics by Channels 
 
Channel Frequency Percent 
Face to Face 514 73% 
Memo/Letter 13 2% 
Telephone 169 24% 
E-mail  11 1% 
 
 
Table 4. 9. Chi-Square Test for Communication Channels 
 
 
Value (X) 
Degrees of 
freedom (df) 
Asymp. 
Significance 
Level (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 39.39 18 0.003
Likelihood Ratio 41.99 18 0.001
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.62 1 0.010
N of Valid Cases 707    
 
 
 
Table 4. 10. Political tactics vs. Project Life Cycle 
 
Project life cycle Political Tactic 
Conceptual 
Phase 
Design Phase Construction 
Phase 
Creating a favorable image 31 24 46 
Ingratiation 19 30 52 
Attacking or blaming others 7 16 78 
Creating obligations/ reciprocity 26 24 51 
Using information as a tool 19 27 55 
Developing a base of support 25 37 39 
Developing allies/ coalitions 30 23 48 
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Table 4. 11. Project Life Cycle and Likely/Unlikely Political Tactics 
 
Politic Tactics Project life cycle 
Most likely behaviors Least likely behaviors 
Conceptual phase Creating a favorable image Attacking or blaming others 
 Developing allies/ coalitions Using information as a tool 
   
Design phase Developing a base of support Attacking or blaming others 
 Ingratiation Developing allies/ coalitions 
   
Construction phase Attacking or blaming others Developing a base of support 
 Using information as a tool Creating a favorable image 
 
 
 
Table 4. 12. The Usage of Political Tactics in Project Life Cycle 
 
Project life cycle Frequency Percent 
Conceptual phase 157 22% 
Design phase 181 26% 
Construction phase 369 52% 
 
 
 
Table 4. 13. Chi-Square Test for Project Life Cycle 
 
 
Value (X) 
Degrees of 
freedom (df) 
Asymp. 
Significance 
Level (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  45.35 12 0.001
Likelihood Ratio 47.55 12 0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.13 1 0.000
N of Valid Cases 707    
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Table 4. 14. Rotated Component Matrix 
 
 Component Component 
 1 2 
Attacking or blaming others 0.871 0.011 
Ingratiation 0.636 0.406 
Creating obligations/ reciprocity 0.561 0.424 
Developing allies/ coalitions -0.056 0.827 
Creating a favorable image 0.383 0.684 
Developing a base of support 0.385 0.656 
Using information as a political tool 0.357 0.624 
 
(Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.) 
 
 
 
Table 4. 15. Mean and Median Values and Friedman Test Results for Political Tactics 
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Mean 3,63 4,10 2,67 4,32 3,87 5,14 4,27 
Median 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 5,00 4,00 
 
N= 101; Chi-Square= 66,650; Df=6; Asymp. Sig.=0,000 
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Table 4. 16. Mean and Median Values and Friedman Test Results for Communication 
Channels 
 
 
 Face to Face Memo/Letter Telephone E-mail 
Mean 1,16 3,20 1,99 3,65 
Median 1,00 3,00 2,00 4,00 
 
N=101; Chi-Square= 210,178; Df=3; Asymp. Sig.=0,000 
 
 
 
Table 4. 17. Mean and Median Values and Friedman Test Results for Project Life 
Cycle 
 
 
 Conceptual Phase Design Phase Construction Phase 
Mean 2,24 2,07 1,69 
Median 3,00 2,00 1,00 
 
N=101; Chi-Square= 14,330; Df=2; Asymp. Sig.=0,001 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The research presented in this paper explores political behaviors in the context 
of Turkish architectural design practice. Architectural design practice is a human based 
activity. It is well known that political behaviors in human based activities can not be 
eliminated. Yet their dysfunctional affects can be minimized by managing political 
behaviors. Managing political behaviors starts by identifying, understanding, and 
developing strategies for dealing them. Therefore, research presented in this paper is a 
preliminary step that can guide architects for managing political behaviors. 
Overall research findings suggest that political behavior is very common in 
architectural design practice and most of the political behavior occurs in the 
construction process.  Furthermore they also point out that oral communication channels 
rather than written communication channels are used for sending politically motivated 
messages, and main-contractors heavily use political behavior in the architectural design 
practice. In the continuation of this study, additional literature survey may lead to a 
better understanding of the negative effects of these tactics, and for their elimination by 
consciously applied counter-tactics such as an insistence on written communication in 
business transactions. 
 
5.1. Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate political behavior that 
commonly occurs in architectural design and construction practice. It explores political 
behavior in multi-temporary organizations from architects’ point of view. Therefore 
research findings represent architects’ perceptions regarding the use of political tactics 
by primary social actors of any construction project (i.e., clients, main-contractors, and 
subcontractors) (2) communication channel used in send politically motivated messages 
by the social actors, and (3) frequency of political tactics used throughout different 
stages of a construction project. Yet architects are not the only social actor of the multi-
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temporary organizations. Therefore future research studies should explore political 
behavior from other social actors’ (i.e., clients, main-contractors and sub-contractors) 
point of view. Such a research study can not only ensure generalizability of the research 
findings but also bring important insights on how to manage dysfunctional 
consequences of political behavior in multi-temporary organizations. Furthermore, 
future research should explore use of influence tactics used in multi-temporary 
organizations because social actor authority and power are not clearly defined in such 
organizations. 
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APPENDIX A  
THE ORIGINAL QUESTIONNAIRE IN TURKISH 
 
 
Figure A. 1. The Original Questionnaire in Turkish 
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Figure A. 1. (Cont.) The Original Questionnaire in Turkish 
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Figure A. 1. (Cont.) The Original Questionnaire in Turkish 
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APPENDIX B  
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Figure A. 2. English Translation of the Questionnaire 
(Cont. on next page) 
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Figure A. 3. (Cont.) English Translation of the Questionnaire 
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Figure A. 4. (Cont.) English Translation of the Questionnaire 
 
